On the Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Coalition Formation Rules by Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez
On the Impossibility of Strategy−Proof Coalition Formation
Rules 
Carmelo Rodriguez−Alvarez
W.A. Wallis Institute of Political Economy. University of Rochester
Abstract
We analyze simple coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned
into coalitions and agents' preferences only depend on the identity of the members of the
coalition to which they belong. We study coaltion formation rules that associate to each
profile of agents' preferences a partition of the group of agents. Assuming that agents'
preferences are separable, we show that no coalition formation rule can satisfy the joint
requirements of strategy−proofness, individual rationality, non−bossiness, and voters'
sovereignty.
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In this note we analyze simple coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is
partitioned into coalitions and agents have preferences over the coalitions they are mem-
bers of. Following the terminology proposed by Dr` eze and Greensberg [7], we focus on
problems characterized by the “hedonic” aspect of coalition formation. Agents’ prefer-
ences only depend on the identity of the members of the coalition to which they belong.
Hence, we exclude the existence of externalities among diﬀerent coalitions. The most
relevant examples of such problems are matching problems as the roommate problem, or
the formation of social clubs, organizations, teams or societies.
More speciﬁcally, we focus on problems in which agents’ preferences over coalitions are
separable. Namely, we assume that whenever an agent i prefers to join agent j rather than
staying on her own, then agent i prefers to join agents j and k rather than joining only
agent k. Hence, we also exclude the possibility of (negative or positive) complementarities
among the members of a coalition.
The literature of Coalitional Game Theory has extensively analyzed the existence of
stable partitions in hedonic coalition formation problems.1 Instead, we propose a social
choice approach. We study coalition formation rules that associate to each proﬁle of
agents’ (separable) preferences a partition of the group of agents. Our main concern is
that our rules satisfy strategy-proofness. Strategy-proofness is the strongest decentrability
property. Each agent needs to know only her own preferences to compute her best choice.
It is well known that the requirements of strategy-proofness are hard to meet. In the
abstract model of social choice, Gibbard [8] and Satterthwaite [11] show that –provided
there are more than two alternatives at stake– every strategy-proof social choice rule is
dictatorial. However, reasonable strategy-proof rules do exist if appropriate restrictions
are imposed on agents’ preferences. This is the case of separable preferences. In the
context of a group of agents choosing a subset from a set of objects (that represent,
for instance, candidates who opt to some number of available positions), when agents’
preferences over sets of objects are separable, then strategy-proof rules can be decomposed
into independent rules, one for each object.2
Besides strategy-proofness, we would like our rule to satisfy three additional properties
that are natural in the context of coalition formation problems. Our rules should be
individually rational, non-bossy and voters’ sovereign. Individual rationality is a minimal
participation constraint. It means that no agent should be ever worse oﬀ than she would
be in her own. Non-bossiness is a collusion-proof requirement. It says that if a change in
an agent’s preferences does not aﬀect the coalition to which this agent is assigned, then the
1For further references, see the recent works by Banerjee, Konishi, and S¨ onmez [2], Barber` a and
Gerber [3], Bogomolnaia and Jackson [5], and P` apai [10].
2See Barber` a, Sonnenschein, and Zhou [4] and Le Breton and Sen [9] for further details.
1remaining agents are also unaﬀected by this change of preferences. Voters’ sovereignty is
a weak version of unanimity. Basically, it implies that all possible partitions of the group
of agents are feasible.
Our main result shows that, even when agents’ preferences are restricted to be sep-
arable, no rule satisﬁes simultaneously the requirements of our four axioms. Then, this
note provides further evidence on the diﬃculties of devising non manipulable rules.
The works by Alcalde and Revilla [1], Cechl´ arov´ a and Romero-Medina [6], and S¨ onmez
[12] are closely related to the present note. All these works study strategy-proof coalition
formation rules. However, they focus on environments in which agents’ preferences are not
separable. More speciﬁcally, Alcalde and Revilla [1], Cechl´ arov´ a and Romero-Medina [6]
assume that agents’ preferences over coalitions are based on the best or the worst group of
agents in each coalition. In these environments, they prove the existence of strategy-proof
rules that always select core-stable partitions.3 On the other hand, S¨ onmez [12] proposes a
general model of allocation of indivisible goods that can be applied to coalition formation
problems. He focuses on preference domains for which there always exist core-stable
partitions. His main result states that there exist strategy-proof, individually rational,
and Pareto eﬃcient rules only if the set of core-stable partitions is always essentially
single-valued.4
The remainder of the note is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model,
basic notation, the main axioms, and the impossibility Theorem. In Section 3, we prove
the Theorem. In Section 4, we show the independence of the axioms.
2 The Model and the Impossibility Theorem
Let N be a society consisting of a ﬁnite set of at least 3 agents. We call a non-empty
subset C ⊆ N a coalition. Let N be the set of all non-empty subsets of N. A collection
of coalitions is a set of coalitions Π ⊆ N. We denote by σ a partition of N and by Σ the
set of all partitions of N. For each i ∈ N and each σ ∈ Σ, σi ∈ σ denotes the coalition in
σ to which i belongs.
For each i ∈ N, let Ci ⊂ N be the set of all coalitions i may belong to. A preference
for i, %i, is an asymmetric ordering on Ci.5 A preference for i, %i, is separable if for
each j ∈ N and each C ∈ Ci such that j / ∈ C, {i,j} i {i} if and only if (C ∪ {j}) i C.
Let Si be the set of all agent i’s separable preferences.
3A partition is core-stable if no coalition of agents unamimously prefer to join rather than to belong
to the coalition they are assigned in the original partition.
4Takayima [13] proves that the converse result also holds under the assumptions of strict preferences
and no externalities in consumption. Indeed, in our coalition formation model, those assumptions are
satisﬁed by agents’ preferences.
5An ordering is a complete and transitive binary relation.
2For each i ∈ N and each %∈ Si, i’s preferences over partitions are completely deﬁned
by i’s preferences over coalitions she belongs to. Then, abusing notation, for each σ, σ0 ∈
Σ, σ is at least as good as σ0, σ %i σ0, if and only if σi %i σ0
i.
For each i ∈ N, each collection of coalitions Π, and each %i∈ Si, let top(Π,%i) be the
coalition in Π ∩ Ci that is ranked ﬁrst according to %i. Let S = ×i∈NSi. We call %∈ S a
preference proﬁle. For each C ⊂ N and each %∈ S, %C ∈ ×i∈CSi denotes the restriction
of proﬁle % to the preferences of the agents in C.
We are interested in rules that associate a partition to each proﬁle of agents’ prefer-
ences.
A (coalition formation) rule is a mapping ϕ : S → Σ. For each i ∈ N and each
%∈ S, ϕi(%) denotes the coalition in ϕ(%) to which i belongs.
Now, we introduce four properties that rules may satisfy. First, agents should never
have incentives to misrepresent their preferences.
Strategy-Proofness. For each i ∈ N, each %∈ S, and each %0
i∈ Si, ϕi(%) %i ϕi(%N\{i},%0
i).
Conversely, ϕ is manipulable if it is not strategy-proof.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that every strategy-proof social choice rule
on an unrestricted domain either is dictatorial or its range contains only two elements.6
As agents’ preferences over social outcomes (partitions) are restricted to depend on the
coalition they belong to and to be separable, the negative consequences of the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem do not apply to our framework.
The next axiom implies that agents should have incentives to participate in the society.
Individual Rationality. For each i ∈ N and each %∈ S, ϕi(%) %i {i}.
We also consider rules such that whenever a change in an agent’s preference does not
change the coalition she is assigned to, then the social choice for the remaining agents
does not change.
Non-Bossiness. For each i ∈ N, each %∈ S, and each %0
i∈ Si, ϕi(%) = ϕi(%N\{i},%0
i)
implies ϕ(%) = ϕ(%N\{i},%0
i).
Finally, we assume that any partition may be the result of the social choice.
Voters’ Sovereignty. For each σ ∈ Σ there is %∈ S such that ϕ(%) = σ.
Our main result shows the incompatibility of the four axioms.
6A rule is dictatorial if there is i ∈ N (a dictator) such that for each %∈ S, ϕi(%) = top(N,%i).
3Theorem There does not exist any rule satisfying strategy-proofness, individual ratio-
nality, non-bossiness, and voters’ sovereignty.
3 The Proof
We begin this section by introducing some properties that are implied by our axioms.
These properties incorporate the idea that a rule cannot be against the preferences of
the members of the society. When there is a partition that each agent considers at least
as good as every other partition, a rule should choose that best-preferred partition. A
stronger requirement would be that whenever the members of a coalition consider this
coalition as the best coalition, a rule should allow them to join, independently of the
preferences of the remaining agents in society.
Unanimity. Let σ = {C1,...,Cm} ∈ Σ . For each %∈ S, top(N,%i) = Ct for each
t = 1,...,m and each i ∈ Ct, implies ϕ(%) = σ.
Top-Coalition. For each C ∈ N and each %∈ S, top(N,%i) = C for each i ∈ C implies
ϕi (%) = C for each i ∈ C.
It is clear that top-coalition implies unanimity. Note that top-coalition is a property
of rules. Banerjee et al. [2] use the term top coalition to name a a property of preference
proﬁles. These authors say that a preference proﬁle satisﬁes the top-coalition property if
for every group of agents V ⊆ N there is a coalition C ⊆ V that is mutually the best
for all the members of C. Basically, our top-coalition implies that if a preference proﬁle
satisﬁes the Banerjee et al.’s top-coalition property, then the rule selects a partition in
which the coalition that all its members consider the best forms.
Lemma 1. Let ϕ satisfy strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and voters’ sovereignty, then
ϕ satisﬁes unanimity.
Proof. Let σ = {C1,...,Ct} ∈ Σ . Let %∈ S be such that for each t and each i ∈ Ct,
top(N,%i) = Ct. By voters’ sovereignty, there is %0∈ S, such that ϕ(%0) = σ. Let
i ∈ N. Let %00∈ S be such that %00
i=%i while for each j ∈ N \ {i}, %00
j=%0
j. By
strategy-proofness, ϕi(%00) %i ϕi(%0). Then, ϕi(%00) = ϕi(%0) = top(N,%i). By non-
bossiness, ϕ(%00) = ϕ(%0). Repeating the argument as many times as necessary, we get
ϕ(%) = ϕ(%0).
Lemma 2. Let ϕ satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and
voters’ sovereignty, then ϕ satisﬁes top-coalition.
4Proof. Let C ∈ N. Let %∈ S be such that for each i ∈ C, top(N,%i) = C. Note that
if C = N, the result is immediate by unanimity. If #C = 1, the result follows from
individual rationality. Let %0∈ S be such that for each i ∈ C, top(N,%0
i) = C, and for
each C0 ⊆ N such that there is j ∈ (C0 \ C), {i} i C0; while for each k ∈ (N \ C),
%k=%0
k. By individual rationality, for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%) ⊆ C. Let %00∈ A be such
that for each i ∈ C, %0
i=%00
i; while for each k ∈ (N \ C), ϕk(%0) = top(N,%00
k). Let
k0 ∈ (N \ C). By strategy-proofness, ϕk0(%0
N\{k0},%00
k0) = ϕk0(%0). By non-bossiness,
ϕ(%0
N\{k0},%00
k0) = ϕ(%0). Repeating the arguments for each k ∈ (N \C), ϕ(%0) = ϕ(%00).
By unanimity, for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%00) = C. Then, ϕi(%0) = C. Finally, let i ∈ C. By
strategy-proofness, ϕi(%0
N\{i},%i) %i ϕi(%0). Then, ϕi(%0
N\{i},%i) = C. Repeating the
argument as many times as necessary, we get that for each i ∈ C, ϕi(%) = C.
Proof of the Theorem.
We prove the Theorem by way of contradiction. Assume, to the contrary, that there is
a rule ϕ satisfying strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and voters’
sovereignty. Then, by Lemma 2, ϕ satisﬁes top-coalition.





such that for each C ∈ Ci0 with C ∩ (N \ {i,j,k}) 6= {∅}, {i
0} i0 C}.
Let ¯ S ≡ ¯ Si × ¯ Sj × ¯ Sk. By individual rationality, for each %∈ S such that for each
i0 ∈ {i,j,k}, %{i,j,k}∈ ¯ S, ϕi0(%) ⊆ {i,j,k}. Abusing notation, for each %∈ S, such that
%{i,j,k}∈ ¯ S, let ϕ{i,j,k}(%) denote the restriction of ϕ(%) to the members of {i,j,k}.
Let %1∈ S be such that %1









By top-coalition, ϕ{i,j,k} (%1) = ({i,j},{k}).
Let %2∈ S be such that %2
N\{i}=%1
N\{i}, while %2




2 {i}. By strategy-proofness, ϕi(%2) %2
i ϕi(%1). Then, ϕi(%2) is either {i,j,k}
or {i,j}. As {j} 2
j {i,j,k}, by individual rationality, ϕi(%2) = {i,j}. Finally, by
non-bossiness, ϕ(%2) = ϕ(%1).
Let %3∈ S be such that %3
N\{j}=%2
N\{j}, while %3




j {j,k}. By strategy-proofness, ϕj (%3) %3
j ϕj(%2). Then, ϕj(%3) = {i,j}. By
non-bossiness, ϕ(%3) = ϕ(%2).
5Now, let %4∈ S be such that %4
N\{i}=%3
N\{i}, while %4













By individual rationality, ϕ{i,j,k}(%4) is either {i,j,k} or ({i},{j},{k}). Note that,
{i,j,k} 3
i ϕi (%3). Then, by strategy-proofness, ϕ{i,j,k} (%4) = ({i},{j},{k}).
Let %5∈ S be such that %5
N\{j,k}=%4
N\{j,k}, while %5




j {i,j}, and {i,j,k} 5
k {j,k} 5
k {i,k} 5
k {k}. By top-coalition, we have
ϕk(%5
N\{k},%4
k) = {j,k}. By strategy-proofness, ϕk(%5) %5
k {j,k}. As {j} 5
j {i,j,k}, by
individual rationality, ϕ{i,j,k} (%5) = ({i},{j,k}).
Let %6∈ S be such that %6
N\{j}=%5
N\{j}, while %6




j {j}. By strategy-proofness, ϕj(%6) %6
j {j,k}. On the other hand, by top-
coalition, ϕ{i,j,k}(%6
N\{i},%2
i) = {i,j,k}. By strategy-proofness, ϕi(%6) %6
i {i,j,k}. Hence,
ϕ{i,j,k}(%6) = {i,j,k}.













Note that %7 only diﬀers from %4 in k’s preferences. By strategy-proofness, ϕj (%7) %7
j
ϕj (%6) = {i,j,k}. By individual rationality, if j ∈ ϕi(%7), then ϕi(%7) = {i,j,k}. Hence,
ϕ{i,j,k} (%7) = {i,j,k}. However, ϕk (%7) 4
k ϕk (%4), which violates strategy-proofness.
4 Independence of the Axioms
The following examples prove the independence of the axioms. If we drop any of the four
axioms, we can ﬁnd rules that satisfy the remaining three axioms.
Example 1 (Strategy-Proofness). Let N = {1,2,3}. For each i ∈ N and each %∈ S,
let
IRi(%) ≡ {C ∈ Ci, such that for each j ∈ C,C %j {j}}.
6Let the rule ϕ−SP be such that for each %∈ S, ϕ
−SP
1 (%) ≡ top(IR1(%),%1) and for
each %∈ S such that top(IR1(%),%1) = {1}, ϕ2(%) ≡ {2,3} if {2,3} 2 {2} and
{2,3} 3 {3}, ϕ2(%) = {2}, otherwise . Note that ϕ−SP satisﬁes individual rationality,
non-bossiness, and voters’ sovereignty. However, ϕ−SP is manipulable.7
Example 2 (Individual Rationality). Let N = {1,2,3}. Deﬁne ϕ−IR in such a way
that for each %∈ A, ϕ1(%) ≡ top(N,%1) and for each %∈ S such that top(N,%1) = {1},
ϕ2(%) ≡ top(N \ C1,%2). The rule ϕ−IR is a serial dictatorship. Clearly, ϕ−SP
satisﬁes strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and voters’ sovereignty. However, ϕ−SP does
not satisfy individual rationality.
Example 3 (Non-Bossiness). Let N = {1,2,3}. Let ϕ−NB be such that for each






N if for each i ∈ N, N %i {i},
({i,j},{k}) if {i,j} i {i},{i,j} j {j} and top(N,%k) = {k},
({1},{2},{3}) otherwise.
It is not diﬃcult to check that ϕ−NB satisﬁes strategy-proofness, individual rationality,
and voters’ sovereignty. However, ϕ−NB is bossy.8




N if for each i ∈ N, N %i {i},
({1},{2},{3}) otherwise.
It is immediate to check that ϕ−V S satisﬁes strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and
non-bossiness. However, ϕ−V S does not satisfy voters’ sovereignty.
7In order to check that ϕ−SP is manipulable, let %∈ S and %0
2∈ S2 be such that {1,2} 1 {1,2,3} 1
{1}, {1,2,3} 2 {1,2} 2 {2,3} 2 {2}, and {1,3} 3 {1,2,3} 3 {3}; while {2,3} 0
2 {1,2,3} 0
2 {2}.
Note that ϕ−SP(%) = ({1,2},{3}), while ϕ−SP(%N\{2},%0







8In order to check that ϕ−NB violates non-bossiness, let %∈ S, %0
3∈ S3 be such that {1,2} 1 {1},
{1,2} 2 {2}, top(N,%3) = {3}, while {2,3} 0
3 {3} 0
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